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I. Introduction
Section 6103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code1 is a general
prohibition against Internal Revenue Service (IRS) disclosure of
confidential tax return information. 2  Subsection 6103(k)(6) is an
exception to the general rule that authorizes disclosure for
investigative purposes.' Included within this exception is an
authorization for the IRS to disclose confidential taxpayer informa-
tion during collection activities such as when imposing a lien on
property or enforcing a levy on a bank account.4 This exception
generates controversy because it is subject to different interpreta-
tions when disclosures are made in connection with an invalid
collection activity.
Courts are split on how to address the issue and generally
follow one of two diametrically opposed theories of interpretation.
One theory reasons that the validity of the underlying collection
activity is irrelevant in determining whether a disclosure made in
connection with that activity is authorized.5 This article refers to
this theory as the "irrelevant theory." The other theory considers
the validity of the collection activity in analyzing disclosures.6 This
theory is referred to herein as the "relevant theory."
This article explores section 6103(k)(6) and related Code
provisions. Part Ii lays out the operative language of the relevant
Code provisions and discusses the underlying policy considerations
as explained by the legislative history. Part III discusses judicial
interpretations of section 6103(k)(6) in three different factual
circumstances. The purpose of discussing the decisions in this
format is, first, to demonstrate the application of the relevant and
1. All references to sections are to the Internal Revenue Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (1994). See also id. § 6103(b)(2) (defining return
information as any data that the IRS has come across with respect to a return filed by a
taxpayer). This definition includes a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, and amount of
the taxpayer's income as well as information concerning the examination or investigation of
the taxpayer's return. See id.
3. See id. § 6103(k)(6).
4. See id.
5. See Wilkerson v. United States, 67 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 1995); Venen v. United States,
38 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 1994); Flippo v. United States, 670 F. Supp. 638 (W.D.N.C. 1987);
Chisum v. United States, No. CIV 90-0549-PHX CAM, 1991 WL 322976 (D. Ariz. Dec. 10,
1991).
6. See Rorex v. Traynor, 771 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1985); Gille v. United States, 838 F.
Supp. 521 (N.D. Okla. 1993); Husby v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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irrelevant theories and, second, to provide a foundation to discuss
the relevance of the taxpayer's underlying culpability.
In support of the conclusion reached in Part V, Part IV
analyzes the relevant and irrelevant theories to determine which
position is the most reasonable. It also explores whether courts
should consider the different levels of taxpayer culpability in
determining the culpability of the IRS. Additionally, collection
activity is discussed in the context of the other investigative
purposes of section 6103(k)(6). The good faith exception of section
7431 is also analyzed in the context of its relevance to section
6103(k)(6).
Finally, a suggested resolution is offered. Part V concludes
that the correct interpretation of section 6103(k)(6) requires
consideration of the validity of the underlying collection activity,
taxpayer culpability, and the egregiousness of the error committed
by the IRS. However, in order to apply these concepts consistent-
ly, the Supreme Court should resolve the conflict among the courts.
Additionally, a minor statutory revision miay be necessary to
resolve conflicting provisions in the Code.
II. Relevant Code Provisions and Legislative History
Before the Tax Reform Act of 1976, section 7213 of the
Internal Revenue Code merely prohibited disclosure "'in any
manner not provided by law .. . ." This language permitted
courts to find a waiver of the right to confidentiality of tax returns
and to permit disclosure even when there had not been compliance
with the regulations.' In the aftermath of Watergate, Congress was
concerned about the amount of taxpayer information the IRS was
supplying other governmental bodies including the White House.9
Congress recognized that our voluntary assessment system of tax
collection depended on the realization that taxpayers expect
information they voluntarily provide to remain confidential.' As
a result, Congress sought to protect taxpayers' reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy by amending section 6103.11 However, in addition
7. Chandler v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 1515, 1518 (D. Utah 1988), aff d, 887 F.2d
1397 (10th Cir. 1989).
8. See id.
9. See Elias v. United States, No. CIV.A.90-0432-WJR(JRX), 1990 WL 264722 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 21, 1991), affd, 974 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1992).




to protecting the confidentiality of taxpayer return information,
Congress also had a legitimate interest in using that information to
aid government efforts to collect taxes.12 In drafting section 6103,
the Senate Finance Committee attempted to balance these
competing concerns. 3 The Committee felt that tax return infor-
mation should generally be treated as confidential and not subject
to disclosure except in the circumstances where the Committee
decided disclosure was warranted.
14
Section 6103(a) expressly states that tax returns, as well as
return information, should be treated confidentially. 5 The general
rule is followed by a list of exceptions relating to situations that the
Committee felt warranted disclosure in order for the IRS to
operate effectively in collecting taxes.1 6 Section 6103(k)(6) is one
of these exceptions that allows disclosure of return information for
investigative purposes. 7
Section 6103(k)(6) allows IRS officials and employees to make
limited disclosures of return information for investigative purposes
as described in regulation 301.6103(k)(6)." The regulation
describes seven specific situations in which the IRS is authorized to
disclose such information. 9 This article concerns subsection (b)(6)
of the regulation. Subsection (b)(6) permits disclosures either to
obtain information necessary to perform a collection activity or to
perform the collection activity itself.2 Specifically, the focus is on
the latter situation in which disclosure is necessary to apply "the
provisions of the Code relating to the establishment of liens against
[a taxpayer's] assets, or levy on, or seizure, or sale of, the assets to
satisfy any [outstanding tax] liability ....
Section 7431 compliments section 6103 by providing a civil
cause of action for knowing or negligent disclosure of tax return
information in violation of section 6103.22 A plaintiff has a cause
of action under section 7431 when:
12, See id.
13. See Chandler, 687 F. Supp. at 1519.
14. See id.
15. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (1994).
16. See id. § 6103(c)-(p).
17. See id. § 6103(k)(6).
18. See id.
19. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6) (1980).
20. See id. § 301.6103(k)(6)-l(b)(6).
21. Id.
22. See 26 U.S.C. § 7431 (1994).
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1) the IRS discloses confidential tax return information;
2) the disclosure is made either negligently or knowingly; and
3) the disclosure is not authorized by one of the exceptions
enumerated in section 6103.23
However, even if a disclosure is unlawful, the taxpayer is denied
recovery and the IRS escapes liability as long as:
1) the disclosure is the result of an erroneous interpretation of
section 6103; and
2) the erroneous interpretation is made in good faith.24
As a result, while sections 6103 and 7431 generally protect
taxpayer privacy, the IRS may nevertheless disclose taxpayer
information in order to collect delinquent taxes. However, it is not
clear whether a disclosure of taxpayer information made in pursuit
of a wrongful collection activity falls within the exception of section
6103(k)(6). This uncertainty is illustrated by the split among the
circuits on the issue of whether a disclosure of tax return informa-
tion is authorized by section 6103(k)(6) when the underlying reason
for the disclosure is invalid.2
III. Invalid Collection Activity-Judicial Interpretations of
Section 6103(k)(6)
A. The Installment Cases
In light of this statutory perspective, two cases follow which
are demonstrative of the different positions taken by the Third and
Eighth Circuits. Perhaps nowhere is the split more defined than in
these two cases where both courts were faced with a levy that was
wrongful because the taxpayers were current on their agreed upon
installment tax payments. The Third Circuit acknowledged the split
when it decided Venen v. United States." In Venen, the taxpayer
complied with a plan to pay back taxes in installments.27 During
the course of the installments, the IRS sent two notices of levy to
the taxpayer's employer which disclosed confidential taxpayer
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. See generally Wilkerson v. United States, 67 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 1995); Venen v.
United States, 38 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 1994).
26. 38 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 1994).
27. See id. at 102.
19971
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information." Subsequently, the IRS admitted that the install-
ments were current and apologized for sending the notices.29
Nevertheless, two more notices were sent the following year even
though the taxpayer continued to be current with the payments.0
The IRS stipulated that the notices of levy were invalid.3"
However, embracing the irrelevant theory, the Venen court ruled
that determining whether a disclosure is authorized under section
6103 does not depend on the validity of the underlying collection
activity.32 The Third Circuit supported its position by maintaining
that a taxpayer's claim based on an improper levy is an issue of
improper collection activity and not improper information han-
dling.33
The significance of the distinction is that the court reasoned
that section 7431 recognizes a cause of action if the IRS is merely
negligent.34 Advocates of the irrelevant theory argue that collec-
tion activity is governed by a separate body of law.35 Notably,
section 7433 creates a cause of action for an improper levy that is
reckless or intentional.36  Mere negligence is insufficient.37
Consequently, the Venen court expressed its concern that analyzing
issues of improper collection under section 7431 would undermine
the culpability requirement of section 7433.38 As a result, the
Third Circuit held in favor of the IRS
39
Conversely, adhering to the relevant theory, in Rorex v.
Traynor40 the Eighth Circuit held that the validity of a levy is
relevant when considering whether a disclosure is authorized under
section 6103.41 Like Venen, Rorex involved a wrongful levy
because of a dispute over an installment agreement.42 In Rorex,




31. See Venen, 38 F.3d at 102.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 106.
35. See id.




40. 771 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1985).
41. See id. at 386.
42. See id. at 385.
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the IRS maintained that the taxpayer had not made timely pay-
ments.43 Subsequently, a second but identical agreement was
signed by the taxpayer and the IRS agent.' Subject to approval,
management disallowed the second agreement and required the full
balance of the taxpayer's liability45 The taxpayer maintained, and
the trial court agreed, that the IRS never notified the taxpayer that
the second agreement was not approved." As a result, the
taxpayer continued to make payments in accordance with the
agreement. Subsequently, the IRS served a notice of levy on the
taxpayer's bank which contained confidential tax return informa-
tion.47
The trial court held that the levy was not authorized under the
Code.48 Consequently, because the levy was unauthorized, the
trial court employed the relevant theory and concluded that the
disclosure of the taxpayer's return information violated section
6103.4" On appeal, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the trial court's
reasoning and held that a disclosure in pursuit of an unlawful levy
violated the confidentiality requirements of section 6103(a)."0
Upon resolution of whether the disclosures made by the IRS
were in violation of section 6103, the Rorex court then addressed
the issue of whether the IRS was subject to liability for the
disclosures."s The government's position was that the disclosures
were made in good faith. 2 However, the Eighth Circuit noted
that the agent served a notice of levy on the taxpayer's bank
without prior notification.3 Furthermore, the agent knew that the
taxpayer had continued to make timely installment payments under
the second installment agreement.5 4 In assessing the facts, the
court asked whether a reasonable agent would have known that he
or she was violating the taxpayer's rights under section 6103 by
43. See id.
44. See id.





50, See Rorex, 771 F.2d at 386.






making the disclosures:" Accordingly, under the circumstances of
this case, the Eighth Circuit answered the inquiry affirmatively and
awarded damages to the taxpayer.56
B. Procedural Defects
The split among the courts is further defined by examining
liens that are wrongful only because they are procedurally invalid.
Both the Ninth Circuit and the Northern District of Oklahoma
addressed this situation. In Chisum v. United States,57 the IRS
disclosed taxpayer return information by recording a tax lien and
issuing a Notice of Sale on the taxpayer's property to satisfy a tax
obligation. 8  The taxpayer argued that the notice was invalid
because it was not mailed to the taxpayer's last known address. 9
Subsequently, the IRS acknowledged that the lien was improper
and it was released.6" However, the government argued that
although the assessment and lien were invalid, the resulting
disclosures were still authorized by section 6103(k)(6).61 In
holding to the irrelevant theory, the Ninth Circuit did not consider
the validity of the underlying assessment in reaching its conclusion
and held in favor of the IRS.
62
However, the Northern District of Oklahoma reached a
different conclusion on similar facts in Gille v. United States.63 In
Gille, the taxpayer and his wife filed separate returns, and the IRS
was in correspondence with the taxpayer's wife on a related tax
matter.' The taxpayer and his wife moved from Utah to Okla-
homa and the IRS recorded a change of address for the taxpayer's
55. See Rorex, 771 F.2d at 387.
56. See id.
57. No. CIV 90-0549-PHX CAM, 1991 WL 322976 (D. Ariz. Dec. 10, 1991), affd, 5 F.3d
535 (9th Cir. 1993) (opinion withdrawn and superseded on denial of rehearing), affd, 19 F.3d
26 (9th Cir. 1994).
58. See id. at *1.
59. See id.
60. See id. at *2.
61. See id.
62. See Chisun, 1991 WL 322976, at *3.
63. 838 F. Supp. 521 (N.D. Okla. 1993). The Northern District of Oklahoma was
reversed in Gille v. United States, 33 F.3d 46 (10th Cir. 1994) on the grounds that the notice
of delinquency was proper. The significance of the following text is to illustrate the
reasoning used within the Tenth Circuit regarding IRS liability for wrongful disclosures in
the context of improper collection activities.
64. See Gille, 838 F. Supp. at 522.
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wife.6" Subsequent to the move, the IRS sent a Notice of Defici-
ency for the taxpayer to the taxpayer's previous address in Utah.66
This was followed by a Notice of Assessment and Final Notice
against the taxpayer; both were returned to the IRS as undeliver-
able.67
Following the final notice, the IRS disclosed taxpayer informa-
tion when it sent several Notices of Levy.68 Subsequently, the IRS
realized that it had sent the assessments to the wrong address and
that the taxpayer was only made aware of the tax liens because of
the levies.69 Consequently, the levies were invalid.7" The ques-
tion before the court was whether the disclosures made by the IRS,
in order to levy on the taxpayer's property, were authorized by
section 6103(k)(6). 7
The court noted that the failure of the IRS to exercise
reasonable diligence in attempting to ascertain the taxpayer's
correct address was a negligent failure to comply with the notifica-
tion process. 2 Accordingly, consistent with the relevant theory,
any disclosure of return information in connection with the
collection activities was found to have violated section 6103 since
they were not authorized. 3 As a result, the court concluded that
when the IRS is negligent in its collection efforts and wrongful
disclosures are made in the process, the IRS is subject to liabil-
ity.74
C. No Taxpayer Liability
The situations illustrated above have one characteristic in
common; the taxpayers had a tax liability to some degree. In the
case of the IRS sending assessments and notices to the wrong
address, the taxpayers still owed the tax even if the IRS did not go
about collecting it correcily. Where the taxpayers were making
installment payments, the liability was dealt with by the installment
contract with the IRS as long as the payments were timely made.
65. See id. at 523,
66. See id. at 524.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Gille, 838 F. Supp. at 524.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 527.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 529.
74. See Gille, 838 F. Supp. at 529.
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The Fifth Circuit utilized the irrelevant theory and decided
that disclosures were authorized even when the IRS assessed the
wrong person and subsequently levied on that person's property."
In Wilkerson v. United States, the IRS claimed that the taxpayer
was jointly responsible for taxes owed by the person the IRS
assumed was the taxpayer's common law husband.76 Consequent-
ly, the IRS issued notices of levy to the taxpayer's bank as well as
to suppliers and customers of the taxpayer's business.77 The
notices disclosed confidential taxpayer information."
The trial court found that the taxpayer was not responsible for
the taxes and held the IRS liable for damages for the levies and for
the wrongful disclosures.79 As in Venen, the wrongfulness of the
notices of levy was not disputed."' Nevertheless, the IRS argued
that the disclosures were necessary to collect delinquent taxes81
Consequently, since the IRS believed it was owed money by the
taxpayer, it was justified in making the disclosures of taxpayer
information under the irrelevant theory.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the trial court and held that the
validity of the underlying collection activity was not relevant in
determining whether disclosures of tax return information were
wrongful.8 2 The court's decision relied on language in the regula-
tions authorizing disclosure when necessary to levy on the taxpay-
er's assets in order to satisfy an outstanding tax liability.8 3 As a
result, the Wilkerson court concluded that the IRS acted reasonably
in determining that disclosures of the taxpayer's return information
were necessary to enforce the Code.84
Similarly, in Flippo v. United States, 5 a taxpayer was assessed
with a penalty.8 6 During the assessment process, the taxpayer
moved from Florida to North Carolina, and the IRS transferred the
75. See Wilkerson v. United States, 67 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 1995).
76. See id. at 114.
77. See id,
78. See id.
79. See id. at 115.
80. See Wilkerson, 67 F.3d at 115.
81. See id,
82. See id. at 116.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 118.
85. 670 F. Supp. 638 (W.D.N.C. 1987).
86. See id. at 640.
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case to its Collection Division in North Carolina.87 Subsequently,
the taxpayer paid the penalty in Florida.88 However, through a
failure in the records, the taxpayer's payment did not follow the
transfer of the matter to North Carolina.89
To no avail, the IRS attempted to reach the taxpayer by mail
so it could set up a meeting to discuss what it still thought was a
pending liability.9" In the process, the IRS sent a Notice of Intent
to Levy by certified mail to a North Carolina address believed to
be that of the taxpayer.91 Someone signed for the letter using the
taxpayer's name." In the letter, the taxpayer was advised to
contact the IRS if the tax had been paid, but there still was no
reply9 Additionally, the IRS attempted to reach the taxpayer
through the taxpayer's mother and former attorney.94 When all
these efforts failed, the IRS levied on the taxpayer's bank account
in Florida.95 In the process it learned that the bank had already
received a release for the tax lien from the IRS.96
The taxpayer sued the IRS for wrongful disclosure of taxpayer
information that was disclosed v hen the IRS notified the bank of
the lien.97 The Western District of North Carolina reasoned that
section 7431 was not intended to interfere with collection actions
of the IRS in collecting delinquent taxes.98 As a result, consistent
with the irrelevant theory, the validity of the underlying lien was
deemed wholly irrelevant to the disclosure issue.99 The court
noted that the IRS did not disclose the tax liability knowing the
disclosure was unlawful.1"
Consequently, the court concluded that the collection activity
was "not entered into with the requisite negligent or knowing
manner which would give the plaintiff a claim under section
87. See id. at 639.
88. See id. at 640.
89. See id.





95. See Flippo, 670 F. Supp. at 640.
96. See id.
97, See id. at 644.
98. See id. at 642.
99, See id. at 643.
100. See Flippo, 670 F. Supp. at 643.
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7431...... In dicta, the court stated that the IRS could have raised
the good faith defense anyway because the agent testified that he
believed that his actions were authorized by the Code.1 2 Thus,
in the absence of any evidence of bad faith, the good faith defense
would have carried the day.
However, in Husby v. United States,'03 the Northern District
of California reached a different conclusion under similar circum-
stances."' In Husby, the IRS sent the taxpayers a Notice of
Deficiency. 5 The taxpayers then filed a Petition with the United
States Tax Court seeking a redetermination of the deficiency."
The IRS acknowledged the Petition, but still assessed the taxpay-
ers. 'fl Although the IRS admitted shortly thereafter that the
assessment was in error, it still continued to pursue the assessment
on several other occasions."8 This activity culminated in a levy
for which the taxpayers wanted compensation for the disclosure of
taxpayer information that was made in pursuit of the levy.0 9 The
IRS blamed a computer for the error."'
The court noted that section 6103(k)(6) authorizes "only
disclosures which are necessary in obtaining information related to
official duties."' 1  In agreement with the relevant theory, the
Husby court held that the disclosures at issue were not necessary
to official duties because the underlying assessment was improp-
er."2  Additionally, section 6103(k)(6) does "not authorize
disclosures made after the government admits that the underlying
assessment was in error.""' 3 Consequently, the IRS was held
liable." 4
The IRS had contended that since the disclosure was the result
of an honest mistake, the good faith defense of section 7431(b)
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. 672 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
104. See id.
105. See id. at 445.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See Husby, 672 F. Supp. at 445.
109. See td. at 443.
110. See id. at 444.
111. Id. at 445,
112. See id.
113. Husby, 672 F. Supp. at 445.
114. See id.
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should apply."' In its reasoning, the court noted that the defense
applied only to good faith misinterpretations of section 6103."6
The IRS did not indicate that any interpretation of section
6103(k)(6) was made since it blamed the fault on a computer.'
Since 6103(k)(6) was not interpreted, the IRS was precluded from
arguing that it made an erroneous but good faith interpretation. 18
Consequently, the court held in favor of the taxpayer. " '
IV. Analysis of the Conflict
A. The Relevant Theory Versus the Irrelevant Theory
The preceding cases illustrate the effect of the irrelevant and
relevant theories in particular factual situations. Proponents of the
irrelevant theory do not distinguish circumstances in which the
underlying reason for the collection activity is valid from those
circumstances in which it is not valid. 2  Supporters of the
irrelevant theory essentially put forth two primary arguments.
First, irrelevant theory advocates look to the plain language of the
Code which authorizes disclosure to collect money to satisfy a tax
liability through lien, levy, seizure, or the forced sale of assets.'21
The focus of their second assertion is that collections and disclo-
sures are separate and distinct bodies of law; therefore, the
disclosure provisions of the Code should not apply to wrongful
collections.'
1. Plain Language of Section 6103(k)(6)
Advocates of the irrelevant theory suggest that section 7431
only provides a cause of action for wrongful disclosure."2 Disclo-
sure of a type that is within one of the seven exceptions to the
regulation is not wrongful. Furthermore, neither section 6103 nor




118. See Husby, 672 F. Supp. at 445.
119. See id.
120. See Flippo v. United States, 670 F. Supp. 638, 643 (W.D.N.C. 1987).
121. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-l(b)(6) (1980).
122. See Venen v. United States, 38 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir. 1994).
123. See Flippo, 670 F. Supp. at 642.
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ultimate propriety of the underlying levy.l"' Thus, the argument
concludes that the plain language of section 6103 allows disclosure
even when the reason for the disclosure is invalid."z Irrelevant
theory proponents suggest that any other interpretation of section
7431 would interfere with efforts of the IRS to collect delinquent
taxes. 126
The relevant theory can best be explored by refuting the
arguments of the irrelevant theory. Rebutting advocates of the
irrelevant theory, who argue that the plain language of the Code
supports their position, requires a close reading of section 6103.
Section 6103(a) clearly states that return information is confidential
and must not be disclosed without statutory authorization.
2 1
Section 6103(k)(6) provides authorization for the IRS to disclose
taxpayer iformation in connection with a collection activity.'
However, the disclosure may only be made in situations and under
conditions prescribed in the regulations.129 The situation in which
the regulation allows disclosure in connection with collection is to
satisfy a liability as defined in subparagraph (3) of the regula-
tions.131 Subparagraph (3) defines liability as the amount to be
collected for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other
imposition or offense under the Code."'
As a result, unless there is an amount to be collected, there is
no liability. Without a liability, the condition under which
disclosures may be made under the regulation is not met. Conse-
quently, any effort made by the IRS to collect money that is not
owed is not authorized by section 6103(k)(6). As a result, the plain
language of the Code and regulation can be read as precluding
disclosure in connection with collection activities unless the
taxpayer is actually delinquent.
Finally, the plain language of the regulation only authorizes
disclosures which are necessary because collection activities cannot
otherwise be accomplished. 32 Disclosures made in an effort to
124. See Wilkerson v. United States, 67 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 1995).
125. See id. at 117.
126. See Flippo, 670 F. Supp. at 642.
127. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (1994).
128. See id. § 6103(k)(6).
129. See id.
130, See Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-l(b)(3) (1980).
131. See id.
132. See id. § 301.6103(k)(6)-1(a).
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collect money that is not owed are not necessary.'33 Otherwise,
the IRS could disclose information about any taxpayer simply by
making the disclosure in the form of a notice of levy.'34 Conse-
quently, where there is no taxpayer liability, the plain language of
the Code and regulation supports the relevant theory that authori-
zation to disclose under section 6103(k)(6) depends on the viability
of the underlying collection activity.
3
1
2. Separate and Distinct Bodies of Law
a. Different Culpability Requirements-Proponents of the
irrelevant theory suggest that Congress intended collection and
disclosure to be distinct bodies of law because of their different
culpability requirements.'36 Supporters argue that the sole
remedy for an unlawful collection is provided by section 7433 which
requires reckless or intentional actions.'37 By comparison, section
7431, in providing a remedy for unlawful disclosures, merely
requires proof of negligence in order for a taxpayer to prevail.'
If the two are not analyzed separately, a taxpayer could use the
lower culpability requirements of section 7431 to prevail on a claim
of unlawful collections.Y1
9
However, taxpayer privacy and collection activities overlap
when the IRS discloses confidential information in order to make
a collection. As a result, contrary to the irrelevant theory, wrongful
collection should be analyzed in the context of the wrongful
disclosure provisions of sections 6103 and 7431 in this situation.
Where collection and disclosure overlap, Congress did not depend
on the internal procedures of the IRS to protect taxpayer pri-
vacy."4  Instead, Congress amended section 6103 with the ex-
pressed intent of reassuring taxpayers that their return information
would remain confidential. 4' Congress demonstrated its commit-
133. See Husby v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 442, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See Venen v. United States, 38 F.3d 100, 106 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Flippo v. United




140. But see Timmerman v. Swenson, No. 4-78-547, 1979 WL 1446 (D. Minn. Aug. 27,
1979).
141, See 26 U.SC. § 6103(a) (1976).
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ment to confidentiality by establishing IRS liability for simple
negligence in wrongfully disclosing taxpayer information.' 42 In
addition, Congress provided punitive damages when wrongful
disclosures were intentional and grossly negligent.143
Consequently, section 7431 can and should be consistently
applied along with sections 7433 and 7426 of the collection
provisions. For example, a situation is conceivable where the IRS
is wrongful but not reckless in trying to collect taxes; it is, neverthe-
less, negligent in disclosing taxpayer information in the process. As
a result, the integrity of the culpability requirements of sections
7433 and 7426 remain intact. Yet, the IRS still faces liability for
the separate offense of disclosure. The Code does not indicate that
this is to be abated in situations where the disclosure happened to
be made in connection with a wrongful collection activity.'44
b. Different Remedies-Advocates of the irrelevant theory
argue that Congress intended collections and disclosures to be
distinct because the damages provisions for improper levy and
wrongful disclosures are inconsistent. 45  Thus, the Fifth Circuit
held in Wilkerson that under section 7426, recovery for an improper
levy is limited to that which the IRS actually collects from the tax-
payer. 46 However, section 7431 allows compensatory damages
for wrongful disclosure.'47
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that "[i]f Congress had
intended to allow recovery of compensatory damages in the
ordinary wrongful levy case, they would have so stated in section
7426. '48 Consequently, proponents of the irrelevant theory
contend that disclosures are not automatically wroagful just
because the collection activity for which they were made is
deficient. 49  Otherwise, taxpayers would effectively be awarded
compensatory damages where Congress specifically provided for
restitution only.5
In rebutting the above argument, a brief look at the relevant
damages provisions in question is helpful. Section 7426 allows a
142. See id. § 6103(k)(6).
143. See 26 U.S.C. § 7431(c)(1)(B)(ii) (1994).
144. See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103, 7431 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996),
1 I5 Se w~ikfwR '?, U~e 'gfr7 FM 12-, 1161 5k0




150. See Wilkerson, 67 F.3d at 117.
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taxpayer to have his or her property returned if the IRS makes a
wrongful levy. 5' Section 7433 allows the taxpayer to recover up
to one million dollars for any wrongful collection that is reckless or
intentional.52 Section 7431 allows the taxpayer to collect compen-
satory damages if the IRS discloses taxpayer information in the
process of a wrongful collection) 53
The fact that the IRS arguably needs to disclose taxpayer
information in a collection activity does not make the relevant
damages provisions mutually exclusive. Indeed, it merely enforces
the drafter's apparent intent that the IRS must be very cautious
whenever it discloses taxpayer information. This includes disclo-
sures made during a wrongful collection. The result is that the IRS
must not be negligent in determining the viability of a collection
activity.
c. Exclusive Remedy-The final and most formidable
argument in support of the irrelevant theory is that section 7433
can be interpreted as the exclusive remedy in connection with
collections. Section 7433 was passed subsequent to section
7431.54 Therefore, when section 7433 was passed, it can be
presumed that Congress was aware of the preexisting case law
interpreting section 743155 As a result, the exclusivity clause of
section 7433 may be read as effectively repealing section 7431 in so
far as it applies to situations now covered by section 7433.
However, a close reading of the provisions may reveal that
there is room for section 7433 as well as section 7431 in the analysis
of wrongful disclosures resulting from deficient collection activities.
The actual language of section 7433 states it is the exclusive remedy
for "such actions."' 56 The actions referred to are the reckless or
intentional disregard of any provision of title 26 in connection with
the collection of taxes.'57 The relevant provisions for this inquiry
are section 6103(k)(6) and regulation 301..6103(k)(6)." -8 There-
fore, section 7433 may be read as providing an exclusive remedy
151. See 26 U.S.C. § 7426(b)(2) (1994).
152. See d. § 7433(a)-(b).
153. See id. § 7431(a).
154. Section 7431 was enacted on September 3, 1982; section 7433 was enacted on
November 10, 1988.
155. See Schipper v. United States, No. CV-94-4049 (CPS), 1995 WL 548715 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 5, 1995).
156. 26 U.S.C. § 7433(a) (1994).
157. See id.
158. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
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when the IRS recklessly or intentionally disregards section
6103(k)(6) in situations dealing with the collection of taxes. 59
Under this construction, there is essentially a two-tiered
application of sections 7431 and 7433. The upper tier engages
when the culpability of the IRS is at least reckless in its collection
activity. In such situations, section 7433 provides the exclusive
remedy for recovering damages. The effect of this interpretation
is that the exclusive remedy provision of section 7433 precludes a
taxpayer from collecting punitive damages under section 7431(c)(1)-
(B)(ii). This result may not be as harsh as it seems since section
7433 has been amended to increase the cap on damages from
$100,000 to $1,000,000.160
Beneath the upper tier still lies a cause of action under section
7431 when the IRS negligently or knowingly discloses tax return
information. This construction is consistent with the legislative
intent to protect taxpayer privacy because, again, it cautions the
IRS to proceed carefully when collection activities may be
potentially invalid. The practical result is that the IRS is forced to
weigh the validity of the collection activity against the sanctions of
section 7431(c).
B. Further Consideration of Taxpayer Culpability
When thinking in terms of the relevant and irrelevant theories,
it is important to bear in mind the different factual circumstances
surrounding the issue. The cases in Part III illustrate the gulf
between the relevant and the irrelevant theories in essentially three
different factual arenas. 1  At one end of a continuum is the
situation in which the taxpayer clearly has a tax liability. However,
because of some sort of procedural defect in the assessment, the
underlying reason for disclosing taxpayer information is invalid.16
Moving up the continuum is the situation in which the taxpayer
addresses his or her tax liability through an installment plan.
Again, the IRS discloses taxpayer information in pursuit of
collecting taxes. 6' Nevertheless, the collection activity is invalid
159. See 26 U.S.C. § 7433(a).
160. See 26 U.S.C. § 7433(b) (Supp. 11 1996) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 7433(b) (1994)).
161. See supra Part II,
162. See supra Part III.B.
163. See supra Part III.A.
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because, pursuant to an agreement made with the IRS, the
taxpayer is systematically and contractually paying off the liability.
At the other end of the scale is the situation in which the IRS
either discloses the wrong taxpayer's information or it has not yet
determined that the taxpayer even owes taxes.' 4  The latter
situation is the most egregious because the taxpayer has no tax
liability Disclosure of taxpayer information for collection purposes
often implies, at the very least, that the taxpayer may be involved
in some type of impropriety. In our society, even the suggestion of
wrongdoing can devastate an individual's career or business by
destroying the confidence of the taxpayer's associates.16 Conse-
quently, these taxpayers, who clearly have no tax liability and-but
for a mistake by the IRS-would not otherwise be exposed to
scrutiny and forced to defend themselves, should certainly be
protected by section 7431.
C. Collection Activity in the Context of Other Investigative
Purposes
In addition to considering the level of taxpayer culpability, the
egregiousness of the error committed by the IRS should also be
weighed in determining whether to consider the validity of the
underlying collection activity. Of the seven situations in regulation
301.6103(k)(6)-l(b) authorizing the disclosure of return informa-
tion, collection activity is the only one which amounts to the last
step in an investigative process."s The significance of this is that
the other six situations are authorized because they are necessary
to determine whether a tax liability even exists.'6 The IRS must
be able to disclose some taxpayer information in order to make this
determination. Therefore, it is understandable that the IRS should
be protected from liability in making those disclosures.
By the time it is necessary to collect a tax liability, however,
the underlying tax liability should have been conclusively estab-
lished. Consequently, there is less excuse for wrongful conduct and
subsequent wrongful disclosure at this point of the investigation.
As a resid!, perhaps courts should avoid a broad interpretation of
sectioii 6103(k)(6) in situations involving collection activities since
164, See supra Part IIIC,
165. See Diamond v. United States, 944 F.2d 431, 434 (8th Cir, 1991).




it is in these situations that the IRS has the greatest opportunity to
avoid mistakes.
D. The Good Faith Exception
Section 7431(b) insulates the IRS from liability for good faith
mistakes made when interpreting the exceptions to section
6103.1" The good faith exception acts as a safety net for the IRS
when all else fails. However, there is confusion in determining the
situations in which the exception applies and what constitutes good
faith. In William E. Schrambling Accountancy Corp. v. United
States,169 the Northern District of California addressed the issue
of when the exception is applicable. 7 ' In Schrambling, the IRS
levied on the accounts receivable of the taxpayer.'7' The levies
were invalid, however, because the IRS did not send a Notice of
Final Demand and Intent to Levy prior to levying. 7 2 The tax-
payer sued the IRS for wrongful disclosure of taxpayer information
made in connection with the wrongful levies."' The court em-
ployed the relevant theory and held that improper Notices of Levy
were grounds for liability under section 7431.74
The IRS did not dispute the impropriety of the levies, but in
its defense, relied on the good faith exception under section
7431(b). ' As stated above, the good faith exception applies to
good faith but erroneous interpretations of section 6103(k)(6).
1 76
The court stated that the relevant inquiry was "whether a reason-
able IRS agent would have known of rights" provided by section
6103 and its regulation. '77
Essentially, there are two areas in which the term "good faith"
may initially seem to apply. The first arises when the IRS' mistake
in not notifying the taxpayer it intended to levy was made in good
168. See 26 U.S.C. § 7431(b) (1994).
169. 689 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D. Cal. 1988); rev'd, 937 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1991) (the Ninth
Circuit reversed on the grounds that the taxpayer's disclosed information had already been
recorded in the County Recorder's Office and, therefore, was not confidential; the court did
not address the "good faith" issue.)
170. See id. at 1006-07.
171. See id. at 1003-04.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 1005.
174. See Schrambling, 689 F. Supp. at 1007.
175. See id. at 1006-07.
176, See 26 U.S.C. § 7431(b) (1994).
177. Schrambling, 689 F. Supp. at 1007.
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faith.178 However, section 7431(b) does not create a general good
faith defense; therefore, it does not apply to good faith mistakes
made in connection with a collection activity.179 Rather, good
faith only truly applies when the IRS or an agent interprets section
6103(a)(6) as authorizing a disclosure when it really does not."
In Schrambling, the agent was not acting under an erroneous
interpretation of section 6103.81 Instead, the agent was acting
under the misconception that the taxpayer had received final notice
and demand prior to the levies.'82 The court noted that the IRS
failed to explain how the IRS had made any interpretation of
section 6103." As a result, the good faith defense was not
available, and the IRS was held liable for violating section
6103(a).'"
The absence of legislative history for section 7431(b) has made
it difficult for courts to determine what standard should be applied
in deciding whether the good faith exception is available in a
particular case."' Consequently, courts have looked to prior
judicial interpretations that explain that the IRS acts in good faith
when its conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
rights of which a reasonable IRS agent would have known.
186
The relevant authorities in this context are sections 6103, 7431, the
regulations, and any pertinent IRS interpretations of these Code
provisions."8 Thus, a reasonable IRS agent is expected to know
the provisions of section 6103 and 7431 as they may be further
clarified by the regulations and other IRS interpretations.'88
Courts have noted that the IRS may be entitled to some
degree of latitude where, at the time of disclosure, there is a lack





182. See Schrambling, 689 F. Supp. at 1007.
183. See id. at 1008.
184. See id.
185. See Huckaby v. United States, 794 F.2d 1041, 1048 (5th Cir, 1986). Cf McLarty v.
United States, 741 F. Supp. 751, 757 (D. Minn. 1990).
186. See Huckaby, 794 F.2d at 1048. See also Barrett v. United States, 51 F.3d 475, 479
(5th Cir. 1995).
187. See Huckaby, 794 F.2d at 1048.
188. See id. See also Jones v. United States, 97 F.3d 1121, 1125 (8th Cir. 1996); Barrett,
51 F.3d at 479; Heller v. Plave, 657 F. Supp. 95, 98 (11th Cir. 1987).
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7431.189 However, presently there is no lack of case law regarding
the correct interpretation of these sections. Rather, the problem is
that the various courts' interpretations conflict. Nevertheless, what
is clear is that in order to prevail over a valid assertion of good
faith, a taxpayer must plead facts sufficient to establish a lack of
good faith." For example, an IRS agent, violating provisions in
the IRS manual that a typical agent would not violate, acts in bad
faith.' As a result, what can be learned from existing case law
is that the good faith exception applies only to misinterpretations
of the Code and that the test is objectively applied. Furthermore,
a taxpayer must prove a lack of good faith on the part of the IRS
in order to prevail over the defense.
One curious aspect of this defense, when raised in the context
of wrongful disclosures in connection with improper collection
activities, is that it seems to be absorbed by the Code provision.
For instance, in a circuit that adheres to the irrelevant theory,
section 6103(k)(6) authorizes disclosure even when the underlying
collection activity is invalid. Thus, the IRS escapes liability.
Additionally, the IRS could escape liability under the good faith
exception because a reasonable IRS agent would interpret section
6103(k)(6) consistently with the applicable holdings of courts within
the agent's circuit. Consequently, courts in that circuit would never
reach the good faith exception in determining whether the IRS was
liable for wrongful disclosures.
Similarly, the good faith defense would have no applicability
in a circuit that adheres to the relevant theory. For example, the
IRS could not claim that it was reasonable to interpret 6103(k)(6)
in a way that was contrary to the circuit's interpretations. The
reason for this curiosity is the split among the courts in the
interpretation of the section. As a result, regarding section
6103(k)(6), the good faith defense is really only applicable in
jurisdictions where higher courts have not committed themselves to
either the relevant or the irrelevant theories. Otherwise, the good
faith defense is only applicable to subsections of regulation
301.61.03(k)(6)-1(b) that address issues of fact.
189. See LeBaron v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 947, 955 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
190, See id. See also Coplin v. United States, No. 91-1338, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 30335
(6th Cir. Dec. 17, 1991) (holding that a finding of bad faith requires a showing that the IRS
acted with malicious intent to cause a deprivation of statutory rights). The standard for bad
faith varies among the courts.
191. See Barrett, 51 F.3d at 479.
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E. Suggested Resolution
In summary, the irrelevant theory considers improper levies
and liens as within the field of disclosure activities authorized by
section 6103(k)(6).'92 Even though a collection activity is improp-
er, it is still a collection activity under the irrelevant theory. 9 3 To
make even a wrongful collection subject to damages for wrongful
disclosure would upset the balance between taxpayer privacy and
the Government's need to disclose taxpayer information.194 As
a result, since Congress provided separate causes of action for
wrongful collections and disclosures, Code provisions for wrongful
disclosures were not meant to create a cause of action for wrongful
collections.195
Intuitively, it seems that this blanket prohibition against
considering the validity of the underlying collection activity tips the
playing field decidedly in favor of the IRS. This position is
especially inequitable when the taxpayer has complied with the
Code and has no tax liability.196 The same may be said for
circumstances where the taxpayer complies with an agreement to
satisfy a tax liability with installments.9 However, the irrelevant
theory gains credibility where the taxpayer fails to comply with the
Code and then sues the IRS for disclosure based on a procedural
defect in the collection activity.'98
The relevant theory, in contrast, provides a more equitable
result in situations where the taxpayer is in compliance. However,
it should be applied very carefully where there is taxpayer
culpability for noncompliance. Where the taxpayer has not
complied with the provisions of the Code and a tax liability results,
perhaps the validity of the underlying collection should be given
very little weight. As the level of taxpayer compliance increases,
as in the installment cases, so should a court's consideration of the
underlying collection activity. Finally, where there is no tax
liability, the invalid collection activity may be sufficient to prove









that disclosures connected with the collection activity were not
authorized by section 6103(k)(6).
This position is supported by recognizing the unique position
that collection activities occupy among the other investigative
functions under regulation 301.6103(k)(6)-l(b).'99 The IRS must
have latitude to disclose information in order to investigate
taxpayers and determine whether there is a tax liability in the first
place. In this context, collections are not really investigative.
Instead, collections are the result of the investigation.
Subsection 301.6103(k)(6)-1(b)(6) acknowledges this distinction
by stating that, for the purpose of collections, disclosures are
authorized both to determine if the taxpayer has anything to collect
and to collect it. Therefore, at the time of collection, issues such
as whether the IRS is assessing the correct taxpayer or whether the
taxpayer being assessed even owes taxes should have been resolved
during the investigative stage. Thus, the tolerance level for
wrongful disclosures during the actual collection should be lower
than that for IRS mistakes in disclosing taxpayer information
during the actual investigative stages. This distinction is completely
lost on the irrelevant theory because, for all practical purposes,
courts utilizing the irrelevant theory do not even consider the
validity of the underlying collection activity.2"
However, conflicts between disclosure and collection provisions
in the Code complicate application of the relevant theory. Even
with a careful reading of the Code, the relevant theory still strains
in its effort to overcome the exclusivity requirement of section
7433.20 Consequently, some courts that may prefer to apply the
relevant theory may refrain from doing so because of their
interpretation of the compatibility of the collection and disclosure
provisions of the Code. Thus, a resolution is called for.
The issue can be resolved by amending the exclusivity clause
of section 7433 to exclude section 6103(k)(6) from its scope. 02
Additionally, the Supreme Court should resolve the split among the
courts by adopting a modified relevant theory.2 3 Under a
199, See supra Part IV.C.
200. See Venen v. United States, 38 F.3d 100, 106 (3d Cir. 1994).
201. See supra Part IV.A.2.c.
202. The last sentence of § 7433(a) could read "[e]xcept as provided in sections 7432 and
6103(k)(6), such civil action shall be the exclusive remedy for recovering damages resulting
from such actions."
203. See supra Part IV.A-
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modified theory, the validity of the underlying collection activity
should be considered in the context of the culpability level of the
taxpayer.2' Furthermore, courts should also consider the egre-
giousness of the error committed by the IRS that made the
underlying collection activity invalid.25  Finally, the good faith
exception of section 7431 should be uniformly applied strictly to
misinterpretations of the Code as intended.2° The practical effect
of this is that the good faith exception would be unavailable as a
defense because the IRS would be on notice as to the proper
interpretation of section 6103(k)(6).
What is being proposed is a matrix of considerations that is
admittedly more difficult to apply than the bright line tests
employed by both the relevant and irrelevant theories. However,
claims against the IRS for improper disclosure in connection with
invalid collection activities are not often brought. As a result,
perhaps the extra burden on the courts would turn out to be
minimal and well worthwhile in situations where equity requires the
consideration of all relevant factors.
Finally, there is at least one collateral issue that courts should
be aware of if the relevant theory is applied too broadly. It is
conceivable that a taxpayer could intentionally choose not to
cooperate with the IRS and sit idly by while the IRS pursues an
invalid collection. By utilizing the relevant theory, the taxpayer
would be in a position to sue the IRS because of disclosures made
during collection process. However, it is the responsibility of the
taxpayer to provide requested information to the IRS if the
taxpayer wants to clear up an IRS error.2" Otherwise, the
taxpayer should be in no position to complain of the error or any
improper collection activity in connection with that error.
2 0 8
V. Conclusion
This entire issue is a question of the level of compliance to
which the IRS should be held responsible when it is performing
collection activities. If that level is too strict, the IRS is constrained
204. See supra Part IV.B.
205. See supra Part IV.C.
206. The Code states that there is "[no liability ... with respect to any disclosure which
results from a good faith, but erroneous, interpretation of section 6103." 26 U.S.C. § 7431(b)
(1994) (emphasis added).




in its ability to enforce the Code. If it is too lax, taxpayers'
personal and business lives may be adversely affected.
Congress made it clear that it intended to protect taxpayer
confidentiality with sections 6103 and 7431.'0 In the process it
acknowledged the concerns of the IRS by creating the collection
exception.1  Courts should interpret the parameters of permiss-
ible IRS collection activity by inquiring as to what lengths the IRS
must go in making collections instead of what lengths it may go.
The irrelevant theory probes the very boundary of permissive
collection activity by disregarding the viability of the underlying
claim against the taxpayer. In contrast, the relevant theory restricts
collection activity only to that which is clearly within the 6103(k)(6)
exception. In light of this, perhaps it is better to err on the side of
protection. However, the ultimate resolution of the conflict
requires the attention of both the Supreme Court and Congress.
209. See supra Part II,
210. See id.
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